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A Tax Comparison of
the Limited Partnership
and the Subchapter S Corporation
This Note compares the limited partnership with the new
Subchapter S corporation. The author analyzes each as a
method for obtaining corporate advantages without incur-
ring federal corporate taxation. He also examines the prac-
tical implications of each as an income splitting device.
INTRODUCTION
THE limited partnership is an unincorporated business
form possessing, by the grace of statutes in all states,' a combina-
tion of characteristics which at common law 2 were peculiar to
either the corporation or the partnership. Businessmen have found
this statutory form of organization suitable for three purposes.
First, it can be used to avoid corporate taxation while securing
some corporate business advantages. Second, it is well suited as a
device for splitting income among family members to obtain in
some instances a family tax lower than that which would be paid
by one member if all the family income were taxable to him.
Finally, the limited partnership has been selected by associates
such as doctors and stock brokers who, by law, are precluded from
incorporating.'
In the last moments of the 84th Congress, Subchapter S was
enacted into the Internal Revenue Code creating a new tax entity,
1. Thirty-eight states have adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. UNI-
FORI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr, 8 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1958). Those states which
have not adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act have statutes similar in
substance. See ALA. CODE tit. 43, §§ 6-27 (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 627&-84
(1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1701-12 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
56-101 to -21 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 362.010-.130 (Baldwin 1955); LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. arts. 2839-51 (West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 181, §§ 17-20
(1954); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5553-70 (1956); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 45-0301 to -326
(1943); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 69.010-.130 (1957); S.C. CODE §§ 52-101 to -128
(1952); Wyo. CoMp. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-701 to -725 (1945). The limited part-
nership is not governed by business corporation statutes. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§
322.01-.16 (1957).
2. The limited partnership did not exist at common law. It was developed in
Italy and France to enable wealthy noblemen to invest in commercial enterprises
without the responsibility of active management or unlimited liability. A limited
partnership act was first introduced in this country in New York in 1822. The
act was modelled after the French Soci6t6 en Commandite, and served as a model
for other states' acts until the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was prepared in
1916. Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 716-17
(1917); Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 895 (1936).
3. For example, in 1949 40% of the stock brokerage firms on the Now York
Stock Exchange had limited partners. John A. Morris, 13 T.C. 1020, 1027 (1949).
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the corporation which elects not to be subject to corporate taxes.
Having made the election, the corporation is relieved of the federal
corporate income tax burden while it can retain the business ad-
vantages it might enjoy under state commercial laws. Furthermore,
through the use of a family corporation electing under Subchap-
ter S, profits may be allocated among family members without in-
curring the cost of double taxation. At first glance, then, Sub-
chapter S challenges the usefulness of the limited partnership by
presenting an alternative which offers greater business advantages
than the limited partnership in a form with which banks, creditors,
and investors are well acquainted.4 This challenge is the subject
of this Note.
The scope of this Note is limited to a discussion of the compara-
tive usefulness of an electing corporation and a limited partnership
(1) for the purposes of obtaining corporate business advantages
without incurring federal corporate taxes; and (2) as income
splitting devices. Consequently, this Note will not discuss the
relative merits of each in estate planning, under state tax laws,
and in organization and dissolution.5
I. CoBPoRATE ADvurAE s WrrmouT CoiuoruAT TAXATION
The avoidance of corporate taxation is the aim mainly of busi-
ness organizations which do not require substantial reinvestment
of earnings, or those which do require substantial reinvestment
but whose members' marginal tax brackets are less than the tax
bracket applicable to the organization's expected profits. The or-
ganization can sometimes avoid corporate income taxes by distrib-
uting its total earnings to the owners through tax deductible pay-
ments, such as salaries, rents, and interest payments. However,
these plans are often unsuccessful, first because they require an
accurate prediction of future profits, and second because courts may
deem the distributions nondeductible dividends to capital owners.0
4. Because the limited partnership is a somewhat unfamiliar business form,
difficulties may be encountered in using that form. See Katz, A Common Fallacy
Respecting Limited Partnerships, 20 CAIF. S.B.J. 105, 109 (1945).
5. State income tax considerations may be of great importance in selecting
a business form in a particular state. For example, Minnesota does not have a
statute comparable to Subchapter S. Consequently the electing co oratioa will
be subject to Minnesota's corporate taxes, and the shareholders -il not be al-
lowed a deduction for federal taxes paid on corporate earnings which are not
actually received. Commissioner's Release, Jan. 26, 1959, 2 CCH STATE TAx REP.
Minn. ff 200-045 (1958); see Mn;N. STAT. § 290.10(9) (1957) (no deduction
allowed for taxes paid on income which is not includible in gross income for state
tax purposes).
6. See, e.g., Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXEs
830 (1956) and cases cited therein where attempted debt financing of a close cor-
poration's dominant shareholders has been struck down as constituting contribu-
tion to capital.
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Corporate tax can also be avoided by an election under Subchapter
S, if available, or by the adoption of a form of business organiza-
tion which is not classified as a corporation for tax purposes.
Though there are many criteria for choosing between these two
methods, one important consideration is the availability of corpo-
rate business advantages in each method.
The limited partnership is an unincorporated business organiza-
tion which enjoys many business advantages similar to those of the
corporation while avoiding the corporate classification tunder fed-
eral tax law. The problem in the use of this form of organization is
to determine which business advantages can exist and to what ex-
tent they may exist without leading to the classification of associa-
tion, taxable as a corporation.
The problems in using Subchapter S to avoid corporate taxes are
different from those of the limited partnership, for an electing
corporation retains all the local law business advantages of a non-
electing corporation. However, some unique problems arise from
possible termination of the Subchapter S election and ensuant loss
of the corporation's tax-free status. This section of the Note will
first examine the nature of the limited partnership, its classification
for tax purposes, and the opportunity it presents for obtaining
corporate business advantages without incurring corporate taxa-
tion; and then will discuss the taxation of Subchapter S corpora-
tions and their shareholders, and some problems which electing
corporations will encounter in retaining corporate business ad-
vantages.
A. Limited partnership
(1) Nature
The limited partnership formed under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act consists of one or more general partners and one
or more limited partners.7 Each general partner is both an agent-
manager of the partnership for partnership business, and the prin-
cipal of his fellow general partners.8 He is fully liable for the
business debts of the partnership.9 Upon his incapacity to fulfill his
managerial or financial responsibilities, the partnership is dissolved
unless the remaining general partners elect to continue the busi-
ness under provision of the limited partnership agreement. 10 The
7. UNIFORM LmrnED PATNimsp AcT § 1. [Hereinafter referred to as
U.L.P.A.]
8. U.L.P.A. § 9 (rights and duties of a general partner are the same as a
partner without limited partners); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIw AcT § 9 (every part-
ner is an agent of the partnership for partnership business).
9. U.L.P.A. § 9; UNIFoRM PARTNERsHmp AcT § 15.
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limited partner on the other hand, takes no active part in managing
the business. His limited authority gives him rights only to inspect
partnership books, to demand and receive, when reasonable, full
information regarding "all things affecting the partnership," to re-
ceive his share of the profits, and to receive his share of capital
upon dissolution or at the time stated in the partnership agree-
ment." The limited partner who acts in good faith is liable for
the debts of the partnership only to the extent of his capital con-
tribution." However, under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
he is liable as a general partner if in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the con-
trol of the business.'3 In many respects the status of a limited
partner is similar to that of a corporate stockholder: the interest of
existing limited partners may be assigned,1 4 the death or insolvency
of a limited partner will not dissolve the partnership, 5 and addi-
tional limited partners can be brought into the organization at any
time.' 6
Thus, the limited partnership is a hybrid organization consisting
of general partners whose rights and duties are similar to those
of partners in a common law partnership and limited partners
whose rights and duties are similar to those of nonvoting corporate
shareholders.
(2) Tax classification
For income tax purposes the Internal Revenue Code generally
classifies business organizations which have more than one bene-
ficial owner as corporations, partnerships or trusts, unless they are
financial institutions or specially exempt organizations. While the
limited partnership is a business organization which must have
more than one beneficial owner, it is not expressly included within
any of these three classifications. However, the Code's definitions
of both the corporation and the partnership are broad enough to
include the limited partnership.' 7 The Codes definition of corpora-
10. U.L.P-A. § 20.
11. U.L.P.A. § 10.
12. U.L.P.A. §§ 1, 17.
13. U .P.A. § 7.
14. U.L.P-A. § 19.
15. U.L.P.A. § 21 (by implication); see U.L.P.A. § 20.
16. U.L.P.A_ § 8. But the right must be given in the partnership agreement.
U.L.P_.A § 9(f).
17. For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, "the term 'partnership' in-
cludes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organiza-
tions, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture
is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate
1959] NOTES
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tion includes unincorporated "associations," while partnership is de-
fined as the residue of unincorporated organizations which are not
"associations." Therefore, the tax classification of limited partner-
ships turns upon the word "association" which is not defined in
the Code but left for the courts and Treasury Regulations to inter-
pret.18
In 1936, after a period of confusion and inconsistent opinions in
the lower courts, 9 the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Commission-
er 20 defined association as an unincorporated group of associates
doing business in a manner similar to that of a corporation. The
Court said that similarity to the corporate manner is a fact evi-
denced by six corporate attributes: (1) liability of the members
limited to the amount of their original contribution, (2) continuity
of business activity, uninterrupted by death, bankruptcy or insol-
vency of the members, (8) management of business activities cen-
tralized in a representative body, (4) free transferability of inter-
ests, (5) ownership of business property by the organization itself,
and (6) use of particular rituals and terminology of corporations."
The Morrissey test has been applied almost uniformly by courts
in subsequent cases determining the tax classification of unincorpo-
rated organizations.2 In doing so, these courts have looked to the
terms of the agreement between the members, 3 local law governing
or a corporation..... " 'The Term 'corporation' includes associations, joint stock
companies, and insurance companies." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(2),
(3). [Hereinafter referred to as I.R.C.]
18. Coleman-Gilbert Associates v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 191, 192 (1st Cir.
1935); Rubin, Associations: Partnerships Taxable as Corporations, 8 LA. L. R,V.
313, 314 (1948).
19. "[T]he decisions are seemingly in a hopeless state of confusion." Coleman-
Gilbert Associates v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 191, 193 (1st Cir. 1935).
20. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). Accompanying this case were three companion cases
applying the Morrissey doctrine to different fact situations. Swanson v. Commis-
sioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Helver-
ing v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935). All four cases involved
the tax classification of organizations claiming to be trusts but the doctrine is
applicable to all unincorporated organizations.
21. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935). The test of title held
by the organization has not been held applicable in cases deciding the tax status
of partnerships on the reasoning that partnerships generally do hold title to prop-
erty. Vernon, When Are Partnerships Likely To be Taxed as AssociationsP, N.Y.U.
4Tn INsT. ON FED. TAx, 489, 507 (1945). The rituals and forms test was ex-
pressly rejected by Morrissey as an important factor in classification and therefore
will not be separately discussed in this Note. However, since this factor may be
of some weight, it is wise for the draftsman of a limited partnership agreement to
avoid corporate rituals when they are unnecessary.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); but see.
Guaranty Employee Assn v. United States, 241 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1957), where
the court purported not to rely on Morrissey although, in reality, it did utilize
Morrissey corporate attributes in making its determination.
23. Smith, Associations Classified As Corporations, 34 CALiF. L. REV. 461, 467
(1946). Morrissey itself emphasized the terms of the agreement.
the entity,24 and any other relevant circumstances.' But because
of the endless number of forms an unincorporated organization
may assume, there is no general rule to determine what combina-
tion of corporate attributes will result in classification as an asso-
ciation.26 Nevertheless, since limited partnership agreements must
be drafted in accordance with and governed by local statutes
which are almost uniform27 throughout the country, past classifica-
tions have value for predicting the classification of other limited
partnerships.
In the leading case of Glensder Textile Co.,-s the Board of Tax
Appeals determined for the first time the tax classification of a lim-
ited partnership -under the Morrissey test. Thispartnership, formed
under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of New York," con-
sisted of four general partners collectively owning a five-twelfths
interest in profits and property, and nine limited partners owning
the remaining interest. Under the New York act, management du-
ties were centralized in the general partners, the limited partners
possessed limited liability, and the partnership was not interrupted
by the death, insanity or insolvency of a limited partner. In addi-
tion, the partnership agreement granted limited partners the right
to fully assign their interests; general partners were given the right
to add limited partners and to elect to continue the business on
the "death, retirement or insanity of a general partner."3° At first
glance, this partnership appeared to have four of the Morrissey
corporate features: transferable interests, limited liability, continu-
ing existence, and centralized management. But the court dis-
tinguished each of these features from those of a corporation. To
distinguish the first three features, the court emphasized that the
general partners' interests were not transferable, that their liabilities
24. E.g., Western Construction Co., 14 T.C. 453 (1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 401
(9th Cir. 1951), nonacq., 1950-2 Cum. Buru. 6; see Paulston, Use of Lfmtited
Partnerships in Tax Planning, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAx INsT. 219, 221.
25. While the plea of the associates must rest solely on their agreement, the
government mayb e able to contradict the terms of the agreement with evidence
of actual happenings. Compare Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S.
369, 374 (1935), and Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 156
(8th Cir. 1937), with Del Mar Addition v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1940), and Huron River Syndicate, 44 B.T.A. 859 (1941).
26. It is universally recognized that not all the corporate features need be
present. See, e.g., Del Mar Addition v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1940).
To establish the Morrissey doctrine, the court selected four cases each found to
possess all of Morrisseys "salient features." The selection may have been made
in order to avoid showing any comparative weight of the features.
27. See statutes cited in note 1 supra.
28. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq., 1942-1 Cum. BuLL. 8.
29. N.Y. PAxTmasmar §§ 90-119 (adopted in 1922, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1922, ch.
640, § 1).
30. 46 B.T.A. at 185.
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were unlimited, and that their deaths would cause a conditional
dissolution. The court distinguished the fourth feature- central-
ized management-by reasoning that because the general part-
ners owned a large interest in the partnership they were acting in
their own behalf, unlike corporate directors who represent the
stockholders. Consequently, the court held that the organization
was not an association taxable as a corporation.
There have been only two other cases which have adjudicated the
tax classification of limited partnerships; in each of these cases the
limited partnership was similar in form to the one in Glensder and
was found not to be an association."' From the uniformity of this
litigation it should be safe to predict that limited partnerships with
no more corporate similarity than Glensder presented, formed in
accordance with acts similar to the New York Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, will be classified for tax purposes as partnerships.
However, the tax classification of limited partnerships with cor-
porate similarity in excess of that found in Glensder is still uncer-
tain. Therefore, the business which contemplates organizing as a
limited partnership for the purpose of gaining more tax free corpo-
rate similarity, in one or more particulars, than that existing in
Glensder, will find useful an analysis of the probable effect of each
corporate feature upon tax classification.
(3) Business advantages
(a) Continuity. It is clear from Glensder that the power of the
general partners to continue the business in the event of "death
of a general partner or by a change in the ownership in his partici-
pating interest" does not create corporate similarity for the purpose
of tax classification; for continuity conditioned upon the election
of the general partners was distinguished from the certainty of
business continuity of the corporation. 2 Nor does the power of
the general partners to admit additional limited partners create
corporate similarity. 3
The general partners probably may also bind themselves legally
by an agreement to elect to continue the partnership upon the
death of a general partner.8 4 However, the presence of such an
agreement would take the organization outside the Glensder rea-
soning that the continuity of the organization was conditioned
upon the will of the general partners and therefore unlike the cer-
tainty of a corporation's continual existence. Furthermore, under
31. Western Construction Co., 14 T.C. 453 (1950); Taywal Ltd., 11 P-I Tax
Ct. Mem. 1044 (1942).
32. 46 B.T.A. at 185.
33. Id. at 185; Taywal Ltd., 11 P-H Tax Ct. 1044, 1045 (1942).
34. See J. A. Riggs Tractor Co., 6 T.C. 889, 898 (1946).
[Vol. 43 :964
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Treasury Regulations, limited partnerships are classified as associa-
tions if their management is centralized, and they are not "inter-
rupted by the death of a general partner or by a change in the
ownership of his participating interest.... "35 In view of this em-
phasis placed upon continuity and Glensder's distinction based up-
on the uncertainty of the general partners' election to continue, it
follows that any restraint on the right not to continue upon the
death, insolvency or incapacity of a general partner is likely to be
considered strong evidence that the organization has sufficient
corporate similarity for tax purposes.
(b) Centralized management. The Glensder court gave great
weight to the fact that the general partners owned a live-twelfths
interest in capital and profits, reasoning from this that they were
acting not in a representative capacity but in their own behalf.30 In
dictum the court stated that if the general partners did not own a
large interest the organization would be an association taxable as a
corporation. However, this dictum, which has never been tested,
may be an invalid interpretation of the Morrissey doctrine which
declares centralization of management in a representative body to
be evidence of corporate similarity. Whether the general partners
are acting in a representative capacity depends in reality not upon
the size of the general partners' interest, but upon the power vested
in the limited partners to subject the general partners to their will.
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act vests full management pow-
er in the general partners; unless this power is restricted by an
agreement or by the circumstances of the parties," the limited
partners have no power to direct the actions of the general part-
ners. General partners will always be free to act in the furtherance
of their own profit interest regardless of the size of their capital in-
terest. A more reasonable test would be one turning on the actual
power of the limited partners over the management by the gen-
eral partners. Should future courts adopt this test, so long as the
powers of the general partner are not restricted beyond the minor
35. Treas. Reg. § 39.3797-5. As there are no regulations under § 7701 of the
1954 Code, the regulations applicable to the corresponding section of the 1939
Code are effective. T.D. 6091, 1954-2 CUm. BuLL. 47.
36. 46 B.T.A. at 185.
37. If, for instance, the general partners were not men with substantial
assets risked in the business, but were mere dummies without real meaning
acting as agents of the limited partners whose investment made possible the
business, there would be something approaching the corporate form of stock-
holder and directors.
Id. at 183.
38. For example, if the general partner's interest was earning a very small
amount, but he was also employed as an attorney for the limited partners who
paid him a very large retainer, circumstances would give the limited partners con-
trol over the gener partner forcing him to act in a representative manner.
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limitations imposed by the act, control can probably be centralized
beyond that found in Glensder without leading to the imposition
of corporate taxes."
(c) Transferability. For federal income tax purposes transfera-
bility of an ownership interest is evidence of an association taxable
as a corporation, while obstructions on alienability are evidence
of a partnership. 41 Such obstructions might be found in the re-
quirement that the interest must first be offered to the existing part-
ners41 or the fact that the absence of formal certificates makes trans-
fer difficult.42 The court in Glensder adopted a narrow view as to
what interests are readily and freely transferable. There the limited
partners were vested by the agreement with power to convey their
entire interest. The court distinguished this power from the power
of corporate stockholders to convey their interest, on the question-
able grounds that though the assignor possessed full power to con-
vey all his rights, he was not required to convey his right to in-
spect the partnership books and demand partnership information.
To strengthen its finding, the court observed that the limited part-
nership interests were not represented by formal written certificates
and, therefore, as a practical matter, they were not easily trans-
ferred.48
In all three cases under the Morrissey doctrine, the general part-
ners lacked power to admit their assignees as general partners."
Using the reasoning applied to transfer of the limited partners' in-
terests, the power of a general partner to assign all his rights should
have no effect on the classification, since he could assign something
less. However, an important element of the Glensder decision was
the fact that the general partners closely resembled "partners in a
partnership without limited partners," and any deviation from this
resemblance may cause a classification of "association."
(d) Limited liability. In the cases determining the classification of
39. In fact, one author suggests that the Internal Revenue Service, Itself, does
not require the general partners to possess a large capital interest if they are con-
tributing substantial services to the partnership, so long as they exercise complete
management control. Heard, New Tax Advantage in the Creation and Operation
of Limited Partnerships, in TAx PLAN.mN Ur-mm Tim Nmv REGrATIONs 56
(1957).
40. Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945);
George Bros. & Co., 41 B.T.A. 287 (1940).
41. George Bros. & Co., 41 B.T.A. 287 (1940).
42. Commissioner v. Gerstle, 95 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1938) (trust case); Glensder
Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942); contra, Commissioner v. Fortney Oil Co., 125
F.2d 995, 998 (6th Cir. 1942).
43. 46 B.T.A. at 186.
44. Western Construction Co., 14 T.C. 453 (1950); Taywal Ltd., 11 P-H1 Tax
Ct. Mem. 1044 (1942); Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942) (could only
assign on the limited partners' consent).
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limited partnerships for tax purposes, the unlimited liability of the
general partners has been emphasized." Correspondingly, when a
"limited partnership association"46 has been classified, emphasis has
been on the fact that in those organizations the liability of all mem-
bers is limited.4 7 Thus, in partnership cases complete limited liability
is an important factor,4 and if the general partners in a limited part-
nership had so few assets that in reality there was complete limited
liability of all partners, this might be evidence of an association.
CONCLUSION TO LD4ITD PARTNERsmp
The business advantages offered by the limited partnership must
be judged separately from the viewpoint of the limited and the
general partners. The limited partner has many of the advantages
of a corporate shareholder, for he has a share in the profits of the
business, his liability is limited to his original investment, his interest
is usually freely transferable and he has the right to inspect the part-
nership books. One important right which the limited partner does
not possess is the right to select management and take part in the
formation of partnership business. Thus, the security of his invest-
ment necessarily rests upon the business ability and integrity of the
general partners. The general partner has fewer business advantages
for he is subject to unlimited liability and his interest is not com-
pletely transferable. However, he does have complete control of
management and may continue the business regardless of the death,
insanity or insolvency of any other partner if the partnership agree-
ment so provides.
Although these advantages may exist to some degree without
causing corporate similarity for tax purposes, it is impossible to
determine exactly what combination of characteristics will create
suflicient corporate similarity to justify corporate taxation. Never-
theless, it is clear that corporate similarity is judged upon not only
the presence or absence of corporate features but also upon the
degree to which one or more features exist. For example, if the
partnership were to issue one hundred written certificates each rep-
resenting a one per cent ownership and each transferable by en-
dorsement only, strong evidence of corporate similarity would be
45. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).
46. The limited partnership association is a business form existing in only four
states- Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. This form differs from
the limited partnership in that all members possess unlimited liability and rights
in the management of the business. See statutes and authorities collected in Note,
43 MwN. L. Env. 305, 317 nn. 58-62 (1958).
47. E.g., Giant Auto Parts, Ltd., 13 T.C. 307 (1949).
48. Driscoll, The Association Problem in Joint Ventures and Limited Partner-
ships, N.Y.U. 17TH Ihsr. ox Fmn. TAX. 1067, 1076 (1959).
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created. Therefore, unless this or similar procedures are of particular
desirability to the investors, they should be avoided. The draftsman
should select only those corporate features which are essential to
the investors, and these should be incorporated into the agreement
only to the degree necessary to fulfill the immediate purpose.
B. SuBCHAP=EE S
(1) Nature
Subchapter S is frequently said to allow a corporation to be
taxed as a partnership. This is a misconception which confuses the
interpretation of a new and consequently unfamiliar tax concept.
It is clear from legislative history that Congress did not intend that
a corporation electing under Subchapter S be taxed as a partner-
ship.49 The electing corporation remains subject to all corporate
provisions of the Code which are not expressly made inapplicable
by the provisions of Subchapter S. Essentially, the election offered
to corporate shareholders is to include in their gross income the
taxable income of the corporation, computed as for any nonelecting
corporation, in lieu of the payment of corporate income tax.
(2) Tax provisions
(a) Election and termination. The Subchapter S election is avail-
able to any corporation qualifying as a "small business corporation,""0
which by definition is a (1) domestic corporation,"1 (2) not a mem-
ber of an affiliated group,52 (3) which has only one class of stock,
(4) owned by shareholders who are all residents or citizens of the
United States and (5) who number not more than ten. To prevent
49. In 1954 the Senate proposed two new sections to the Code which were in-
tended to enable certain small business organizations to select their business form
without consideration of tax consequences. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
118 (1954). The proposed § 1361 which enabled certain partnerships to elect to
be taxed as corporations was enacted into the Code as Subchapter R (§ 1361). On
the other hand, the Conference Committee rejected the complementary provision, §
1351, which enabled certain corporations to elect to be taxed in accordance with
the partnership provisions of Subchapter K. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 118 (1954); Frost, New Election of Certain Corporations Not To Be Taxcd
as Such, 45 A.B.A.J. 81 (1958). Subsequently, in 1958 Congress enacted Sub-
chapter S to fulfill its original purpose. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2(1 Sess.
87 (1958). However, the provisions of the new Subchapter fundamentally differ
from those rejected in 1954; they do not provide that an electing corporation changes
its tax classification to that of a partnership.
50. I.R.C. § 1371(a).
51. "The term 'domestic' when applied to a corporation or partnership means
created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States
or of any State or Territory." I.R.C. § 7701(a) (4).
52. The definition of "affiliated group" given in § 1504(a) of the 1954
Code is incorporated into Subchapter S. I.R.C. § 1371(a).
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frustration of the ten shareholder requirement, (6) all shareholders
must be individuals or estates. 53
Formally the election is made by the "small business corporation."
but it is valid only upon the written consent of all shareholders of
record on the first day of the first taxable year for which the elec-
tion is to be effective, or, if the election is made subsequent to that
day, on the day of the election.5 4 The election can be validly made
in the first month of a taxable year or in the preceeding month, and
once made the election is effective for that taxable year and all
subsequent taxable years unless it is either terminated by law or
voluntarily revoked.55
Termination by law occurs whenever the corporation ceases to be
a "small business corporation." 56 However, if the corporation elects
prior to the first election year, the corporation must be a small busi-
ness corporation only during the election year. The election is also
terminated by law if a new shareholder enters the corporation and
fails to consent in writing to the election within thirty days. Finally,
the election terminates by law if the corporation derives more than
eighty percent of its gross receipts from foreign sources, or more
than twenty percent of its gross receipts as a "personal holding com-
pany," from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales
or exchanges of stock or securities.55
The corporation may voluntarily revoke the election for any
taxable year subsequent to the first year, with the unanimous con-
sent of all shareholders, and only if the revocation is made before
the end of the first month of that year.59 However because the
election is terminated by law if the corporation ceases to be a "small
business corporation" or if a new shareholder enters and does not
consent, voluntary termination may be indirectly accomplished for
any taxable year at any time during the year if one shareholder
transfers shares to a person or organization who will cause a termi-
nation by law. 60
(b) Taxation of the shareholders. Each shareholder of an electing
53. "The term 'person' shall be construed to mean and include an individual,
a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation." I.R.C. § 7701(a)
(1). Thus, by requiring that all shareholders be individuals, Congress has eliminated
corporations whose shareholders include "a trust, ... partnership, association,
company or corporation."
54. I.R.C. § 1372(a).
55. LR.C. §§ 1372(c), (d).
56. LR._C. § 1372(e)(3).
57. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1); T.D. 6317, 1958 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 41, at 77.
58. I.R.C. §§ 1372(e)(4), (5).
59. LR.C. § 1372(e)(2).
60. For a more detailed discussion of Subchapter S see Anthoine, Federal Tax
Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amendment, 58
COLum. L. REv. 1146 (1958).
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corporation must include all dividend distributions in his own gross
income." In accordance with section 816 of the Internal Revenue
Code, distributions of money or other property are dividend dis-
tributions to the extent of the undistributed earnings and profits
of the current year plus any accumulated earnings of prior non-
electing years. However, distributions either out of capital or the
earnings of prior electing years are not dividends and therefore
not included in gross income.2
In addition to actual dividend distributions, Subchapter S creates
a pro rata constructive distribution on the last day of the corpora-
tion's taxable year.Y The constructive distribution is equal in
amount to the corporation's undistributed taxable income, that is
the corporation's taxable income less actual dividends of money
which, as has been seen, are taxed separately as 316 dividends
paid during the year.64 The shareholder includes in his income that
portion of the constructive distribution which he would have re-
ceived as a dividend out of current and accumulated earnings had
those amounts actually been distributed. This rather complicated
method of computing the amount includible in a shareholder's
income is unnecessary if the corporation makes only cash distribu-
tions during the year. For this situation the rule could simply be
stated that the shareholder includes in his gross income his pro
rata share of the corporation's undistributed taxable income. How-
ever, where property distributions are made the more complicated
method is necessary, because dividends of property other than
money do not reduce the size of the constructive distribution.05
Thus, if taxable income equals current earnings and profits, the con-
structive distribution will exceed in amount undistributed current
earnings and profits by the value of any property distribution as-
suming that value and basis are the same. 6 In accordance with
the proposed regulations, this excess must be included in the
shareholders gross income to the extent the corporation has ac-
cumulated earnings.6 7 This result follows because, if the corpora-
tion has no accumulated earnings, the excess would not have been
received as a dividend and therefore is not includible in gross
income.
61. I.R.C. § 61 (a) (7).
62. Undistributed taxable earnings of prior electing years are not a part of
accumulated earnings. I.R.C. § 1377(a).
63. I.R.C. § 1373(b).
64. I.R.C. § 1373(d).
65. Compare I.R.C. § 1373(c), with I.R.C. §§ 316(a), 317(a).
66. A corporate distribution of property other than money generally reduces
current earnings and profits by the adjusted basis to the corporation of tho prop-
erty distributed. I.R.C. § 312(a).
67. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b), 24 Fed. Reg. 1802 (1959).
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Suppose, for example, an electing corporation has accumulated
earnings of $5,000, and current earnings and profits and taxable in-
come of $10,000. If a cash distribution of $6,000 is made, the share-
holder must include in gross income his share of the $6,000 divi-
dend, for that entire amount would have been taxable as a distribu-
tion from earnings and profits of the current year. In addition, each
shareholder must include his share of the $4,000 "undistributed
taxable income" ($10,000 taxable income minus $6,000 of divi-
dends of money from current earnings) on the last day of the cor-
poration's taxable year. Had that $4,000 been distributed it would
have been a dividend from current earnings and profits.
If instead of distributing cash the corporation distributes prop-
erty with a fair market values and basis of $6,000, the shareholder
must again include his share of the $6,000 in gross income as a
dividend from current earnings. However, the additional amount
that must be included in his income is a pro rata share of $9,000;
had an amount been distributed equal to the "undistributed taxable
income," which is $10,000 since these are no money dividends to
be subtracted from the corporation's taxable income, the first $4,000
would have been includible as a dividend from current earnings,
the next $5,000 would also have been includible as a dividend from
accumulated earnings; but the last $1,000 would have been
treated as a nonincludible capital distribution so long as it did not
exceed the shareholders' basis of the stock.70 If both cash and
property distributions were made during the year, the cash would
reduce current earnings and profits first. This example illustrates
that distributions of property by an electing corporation which has
accumulated earnings are generally inadvisable.
In order to make the foregoing computations, the taxable income
of the electing corporation must be determined. This is deter-
mined without taking net operating loss deductions or the special
corporate deductions under part VIII of Subchapter B." But aside
68. If property other than money is distributed to noncorporate distributees
the amount which is received equals the fair market value of the distribution.IlPLC. § 801(b)(1)(A).
69. All distributions are considered to be from current earnings and profits to
their extent and then from the most recently accumulated earnings. LR.C. I 316(a).
70. If the corporation has distributed total current earnings and accumulated
earnings, additional distributions are considered to be from capital. If the distribu-
tion exceeds the shareholder's basis of his stock, the excess is treated as capital
gain. LR.C. § 301(c).
71. LR.C. § 1373(d). The deductions which are not allowed are (1) net oper-
ating loss deduction, LR.C. § 172; (2) deduction of interest on federal govern-
ment obligations when the interest is exempt from tax by the authorizing act,
LR.C. § 242(a); (3) 85% dividend received deduction, LIC. § 243; (4) a partial
deduction of dividends received from preferred stock of public utilities, LR.C. §§
244, 247; (5) a partial deduction of dividends received from foreign corpora-
tions, LB.C. § 245.
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from these, there are no special provisions for computing the tax-
able income of an electing corporation, and it is computed in the
same manner as the taxable income of a corporation which does
not come under the provisions of Subehapter S. For example, the
electing corporation is free to reduce taxable income by amounts
equal to fringe benefit deductions allowed to nonelecting corpora-
tions."2 It could be objected that since the employee-owners are
taxed for all practical purposes as partners in the enterprise, the
corporation should not get the benefit of deducting from taxable
income benefits paid to or for the employee-owners. But, had Con-
gress intended this result it could have either added the fringe
benefit deductions to those expressly excluded or adopted the form
of Subchapter R by providing that electing corporations be taxed
as partnerships. 3
Another problem the shareholder will face in determining the
amount of the tax he must pay on the electing corporation s in-
come is the proper characterization of the income in his hands.
On most corporate income he must pay tax at ordinary income rates,
notwithstanding any special features the income may have had to
the corporation.74 Thus, while income from municipal bonds owned
by the corporation does not increase the corporation's taxable in-
come, it does increase the corporation's accumulated earnings and
profits and it will be taxable to the shareholders upon distribution.
However, special provisions allow each shareholder to treat his
pro rata share of the corporation's net long term capital gain over
net short term capital loss as personal long term capital gain, up
to, but not exceeding the corporation's taxable income.6 Thus
the long term capital gain allowable is reduced by any net loss from
other sources.76 This favorable provision may lead shareholders to
elect to be taxed under its provisions for years in which they antici-
pate large long-term capital gain.
As might be expected, previously taxed undistributed taxable
72. Through the use of "fringe benefits" a corporation may defer recognition
of a portion of the employee's income. See I.R.C. § 106 (employer contributions
to accident and health plans); I.R.C. §§ 401-04 (pension and profit-sharing plans).
Often the corporation may be able to make tax-free payments to the employc or
his survivors. See I.R.C. § 101(b) (employee death benefits); I.R.C. § 104 (com-
pensation for injuries or sickness).
73. Section 1361(d) of Subchapter R which allows certain partnerships to be
taxed as corporations does expressly exclude employee owners from the benefits of
§ 401 (a) (employee pension trusts).
74. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1958).
75. I.R.C. § 1375(a)(1).
76. See I.R.C. § 61(3). As taxable income consists of gains from the sale or
exchange of property and taxable gains from other sources, taxable income can
be less than long term capital gain only if there is a net recognizable loss from
other sources.
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income does not become part of the accumulated earnings and
profits of the corporation, and therefore it is tax free to the share-
holder upon distribution.77 A problem arises, however, as to when
previously taxed undistributed taxable income may be distributed.
The proposed regulations make it clear that a cash distribution 78
in excess of current earnings and profits is tax free to the share-
holder to the extent that he included in his income for earlier years
previously taxed undistributed taxable income of the current elec-
tion.79 Although this distribution will be tax free regardless of the
presence of accumulated earnings, there can be no tax free distribu-
tion prior to total distribution of accumulated earnings unless total
current earnings and profits have been distributed in cash. 0
However, the right to receive a tax free distribution out of previ-
ously taxed undistributed income when the corporation has ac-
cumulated earnings is personal to the shareholder who (a) paid
the previous tax (b) during the current election.8' Therefore, upon
transfer of the shareholder's stock 2 or upon termination of the
election previously taxed undistributed income becomes a part of
the capital of the corporation, 3 and cannot be distributed before
accumulated earnings.
To avoid the problem of termination or transfer of stock before
previously taxed "undistributed taxable income" has been com-
pletely distributed, it has been suggested that net taxable income
for each election year should be predicted before the end of the
taxable year and paid out as money dividends.8 4 If the earnings are
77. LR.C. § 1377(a). The portion of undistributed taxable income upon which
tax has been paid is treated as a reinvestment, and consequently the shareholders
basis of stock is increased by this amount when he pays the tax. LR.C. § 1376(a).
78. A distribution of property cannot be a distribution of previously taxed
undistributed taxable income. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1875-4(b), 24 Fed. Reg.
1802 (1959).
79. LR.C. § 1875(d)(2); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1875-4, 24 Fed. Reg. 1802
(1959). The amount which may be so distributed is reduced by the amount al-
lowed to the shareholder as a net operating loss in prior years in which the current
election was effective. I.R.C. § 1375(d)(2)(B)(i).
80. As noted in the proposed treasury regulations, this is a lo cal result of
two rules formulated in the regulations; (1) when property and cash distributions
are made, current earnings and profits are first allocated to the cash distributions,
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1873--1(d), 24 Fed. Reg. 1799 (1959), and (2) undis-
tributed taxable income can only be distributed in cash, Proposed Treas. Beg. §
1.1375-4(b), 24 Fed. Beg. 1802 (1959).
81. I.B.C. § 1375(d)(2); Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1375-4(a), (e), 24 Fed.
Reg. 1802 (1959).
82. This apparently includes transfers by sale, devise or gift.
83. As previously taxed undistributed taxable income is not part of accumulated
earnings, I.R.C. § 1377(a), termination must cause it to become an addition to
capital.
84. E.g., Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and
Collapsible Amendment, 58 CoLum. L. Bv. 1146, 1164 (1958).
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needed in the business, they can be lent back. The danger in this
scheme lies in the possibility of termination after the dividend but
before the end of the taxable year or determination after the close
of the taxable year that the corporation was not a Subchapter S
small business. In that event, the corporation will pay corporate
income tax upon total taxable income of that year, and in addition
the shareholders will pay personal income tax upon total earnings
and profits even though much of those earnings may be reinvested.
Another danger is the possibility of over-estimating the earnings,
thus forcing the stockholders to pay personal income tax on an un-
intended distribution of accumulated earnings which were, for
all practical purposes, a part of permanent capital.
Related to the foregoing income tax considerations under Sub-
chapter S, is the problem of determining how the losses of the
electing corporation will be treated. Although a net operating loss
incurred during an election year cannot be deducted from the
electing corporation's income,85 a shareholder can deduct his pro
rata share of such a loss directly from his gross income 0 and can
treat any excess as an operating loss carryover.87
The shareholder's net operating loss deduction first reduces the
basis of his stock until that basis is exhausted, and then reduces
the basis of any debt owed to him by the corporation. 8 Of course,
since neither basis can be negative, operating loss is deductible
only to the extent of the shareholder's basis of stock and debt as of
the last day of the taxable year, or, if he sells his stock during the
year, on the day of sale.80 Shareholders whose basis is less than
their expected share in operating loss may take advantage of the
loss by lending money to the corporation before the close of the
taxable year. The shareholder would then obtain an operating loss
deduction for the cost of an equal amount of capital gain in the
repayment year.
The pro rata share of loss of each stockholder is calculated by a
per day allocation, and is allowed to any person who held shares
during the year.90 Thus, while the corporation on a fiscal taxable
year may manipulate income between the calendar taxable years
of its shareholders by the use of dividends, loss is evenly distributed
throughout the year. This provision eliminates the possibility of
85. See note 71 supra.
86. I.R.C. § 1374(b).
87. Under § 1374(d)(1) the operating loss deduction is considered a loss
from trade or business of the shareholder. Therefore, the loss may be carried back
or carried over under § 172 without the limitation imposed by subsection 172(d) (4).
However, the loss cannot be carried back to years beginning before January 1,
1958. I.R.C. § 1374(d) (2).
88. I.R.C. § 1376(b).
89. I.R.C. § 1374(c)(2).
90. I.R.C. § 1374(c)(1).
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shifting of loss among taxpayers before the end of the corporate
year.9 1
(3) Business advantages
Although an electing corporation may obtain all local law corpo-
rate business advantages, certain problems are created by the
qualifying and terminating features of the subchapter provisions
themselves.
A. Continuity
While the electing corporation's life is continuous, its status
as an organization free from federal income tax is uncertain. Some
terminating events cannot effectively be predicted or precluded
from occuring. Therefore, there is always a chance of an unexpect-
ed termination by law in the middle of a taxable year, and if an
organization selects the corporate form, relying upon Subchapter
S to avoid corporate taxation, termination of the election may dic-
tate immediate reorganization in an unincorporated form.
B. Transferable interest
Though the electing corporation, like any other corporation,
may make its stock freely transferable, the owners will find it de-
sirable to place conditions on alienability. The election will termi-
nate if any of the Subchapter S restrictions on stock ownership are
violated.92 Furthermore, the requirement of consent of all new
stockholders93 places the minority stockholder in a strong position
to force the majority stockholders to purchase his stock at a price
higher than its reasonable value, to force high dividends, or to
adopt a minority policy view. But even assuming the good faith of
all stockholders, this requirement still presents dangers because
the individual purchasing interests in the corporation may have
good business reasons for refusing to consent to the election. Sup-
pose, for example, that the corporation retains much of its earn-
ings for the expansion of its assets. A new shareholder's outside
income may be so low or so high that he cannot pay or will not
profit from paying individual tax on the earnings retained, and will
therefore prefer to pay taxes only on dividends actually dis-
tributed 4
91. For a more detailed discussion of the Subehapter S treatment of taxable
income and loss see Note, 72 Htnv. L. REv. 710, 714-21 (1959). This, however,
should now be read in conjunction with the recently purposed regulations, Proposed
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1871-77, 24 Fed. Reg. 1793-1805 (1959).92. I.R.c. § 1372(d)(3).
93. See note 57 supra.
94. Suppose the new shareholder had no outside income and his estimated
share in corporate earnings is $10,000 of which only $2,500 is to be distributed.
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A possible method of protecting the election against such termi-
nations is a requirement that stock cannot be sold before first be-
ing offered for sale to the individual stockholders or the corpora-
tion. This type of agreement is probably valid and enforceable."
The utility of the "first offer" agreement, however is limited by the
necessity of obtaining funds to purchase a large interest and also
the problem of determining an agreeable, pre-arranged pricing de-
vice. A more workable method may be a condition on the sale of
stock allowing transfers only to individuals who, prior to transfer,
agree to the election. Further transfer should be allowed only
when the whole interest is conveyed to one individual who is a
resident or a citizen. If shares are transferred as community prop-
erty, or to several people individually, as joint tenants, tenants in
common, or tenants by the entireties, the ten shareholder require-
ment may be violated.
The drawback in directly restricting the transferability of the
shares by imposing conditions on their sale is the possibility that
the conditions will be held invalid." However, since courts gener-
ally uphold such conditions in closely held corporationsU if the
conditions do not prohibit sale and tend to promote better and
more unified management,98 conditions on an electing corporation's
stock designed to protect an election may well be deemed valid.
C. Centralized management
Although Subchapter S provides that a corporation cannot qual-
ify for the election if it has more than one class of stock, the Sub-
chapter does not designate the distinguishing features that will
create separate classes of stock. However, the proposed regulations
provide that any difference in the voting, distribution or dividend
rights will create two classes of stock. 9 One author has suggested
Assuming his adjusted gross income to be $8,400, he is left with $314 of disposable
income. On the other hand, if his outside income were $50,000, he would have a
reduction of net income after taxes of $5,000. See I.R.C. § 1(a).
95. First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 73 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio C.P. 1945); see generally,
CmnusTy, TRAssFER OF STOCK § 39 (3d ed. 1958); 2 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948).
96. See generally, O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held
Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 773 (1952). The restriction
must also comply with the UMFORM STOcK TRA~sFxa AcT § 15 (adopted in all
50 states and the District of Columbia, 6 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1958)). Section 15
states: "[TIhere shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so represented
[by a written certiflcate] by virture of any by-laws of such corporation, or other-
wise, unless the right of the corporation to such lien or the restriction Is stated
upon the certificate."
97. O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 H~Av. L. REv. 773, 777-78 (1952); Annot., 65 A.L.R.
1159, 1165 (1930).
98. See Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 371-72, 178 N.W.
957, 959 (1920).
99. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), 24 Fed. Reg. 1794 (1959).
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debt financing as a means of circumventing the "one-class" re-
quirement,100 but the proposed regulations make it clear that such
an attempt will be very carefully scrutinized. 1' 1 Because of the
rigid interpretation given this requirement by the proposed regula-
tions, it will probably be impossible for a promoter to obtain non-
representative management control of an electing corporation. -102
CONCLUSION PART I
While the limited partnership and the electing corporation both
possess many corporate business advantages without incurring cor-
porate taxation, there exist some important differences in the busi-
ness advantages obtainable under each form. For this reason the
decision between the two forms should be individualy made to
tailor the organization to meet the desires of the particular asso-
ciates.
The greatest difference, which also will often be the most im-
portant consideration to the investors, is the centralization of man-
agement control. If all investors wish to have a voice in selecting
the management, the limited partnership is unacceptable, while
if one or several of the investors demand unfettered control of
management, the electing corporation, which must consist entirely
of stock with equal voting rights, is equally unacceptable. Differ-
ences of a lesser degree also exist in each of the other corporate
advantages previously discussed.
If all investors desire limited liability the limited partnership
will not satisfy their needs, for under this form at least one in-
vestor must be willing to assume both unlimited liability and man-
agement responsibility. On the other hand, if one investor demands
both a voice in management and limited liability, the limited part-
nership is similarly unsuitable. In these situations the electing
corporation would satisfy all requirements, since each member
would have limited liability without sacrificing his voice in man-
agement However, limited liability of all members would be ef-
100. Crane, Election of Certain Small Business Corporations as to Income Tax
Status, 10 HAsTIGS L. REv. 271, 273 (1959).
101. See note 99 supra.
102. Possibly some subtle differences in voting power may exist without viola-
tion of the "one class of stock" requirement. For example, in accordance with
the Technical Information Release of November 26, 1958, a corporation with
class A and class B stock each voting for one-half of the members of the board of
directors does not violate the one class of stock requirement. Upon this ruling, the
promoter owning all stock in class A could retain one-half voting control regard-
less of the relative number or value of his stock. However, the Proposed Regula-
tions state that the one class of stock requirement will be violated in this situa-
tion unless "each group has the right to elect members of the board of directors in
a number proportionate to the number of shares in each group." Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), 24 Fed. Reg. 1794 (1959).
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fectively obtained in the limited partnership if the general part-
ners were men with little personal wealth. But according to the
dicta in the Glensder case such an organization would be an as-
sociation taxable as a corporation.
In undertakings which require a large capital investment over a
long period, continuity of the organization will often be essential,
for the power in an investor or his representative to demand the
return of his capital investment upon the happening of an un-
predictable event may force the untimely liquidation of essential
assets. For such undertakings, the organization must possess the
flexibility of an electing corporation to replace a managing mem-
ber upon his death, incapacity or retirement without disrupting
the business operation. Although the problem could be partially
cured through the use of partnership insurance and installment
buy-out agreements, the limited partnership may still be inadvisa-
ble in such undertakings, especially since the difficulty and expense
of such curative measures is avoided by the use of the electing
corporation form. However, in undertakings of short duration or
those which require only a small capital investment, the condi-
tional continuity of the limited partnership may adequately satis-
fy investor requirements.
Finally there is some difference in the transferability of stock
in an electing corporation and an interest in a limited partnership.
The transferor of a limited partner's interest may convey all his
rights and interests, while the transferee of stock in an electing
corporation cannot convey the valuable right to receive tax free
distributions from undistributed taxed income prior to the distribu-
tion of accumulated earnings. The loss of this right will be borne
by the transferor, and consequently will discourage transfer in busi-
nesses which have accumulated earnings. On the other hand, the
common unfamiliarity with the limited partnership form may
hamper the sale of the limited partnership interest.
II. FAMILy INCOME SPLITTING
Dividing the income from a family business among the members
of the family spending unit may reduce the family's total tax bur-
den without reducing its income. However, since a basic principle
of federal income taxation requires that income be taxed to the
person who actually earns it, income may be shifted to family mem-
bers for tax purposes only to the extent of the value of services
they render to the business, and the profits attributable to their
capital interests in the business. 08 If one or more family members
103. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930); Leeb v. Jarecki, 156 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
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do not or cannot -render services to the business, income can still
be successfully shifted in many cases by transferring capital inter-
ests to them.10 4 This section will examine the requirements which
must be satisfied to successfully transfer a capital interest to fam-
ily members, for tax purposes, both in a limited partnership and in
an electing corporation.
A. Limited partnership
In order to successfully shift partnership income by transferring
a capital interest to another member of the taxpayer's family (1)
capital must be a factor in the production of the partnership's in-
come 10 5 and (2) the grantor must constitute the grantee a partner
for tax purposes. 00 Although a business purpose for forming a
partnership is no longer required, 07 the parties must have a good
faith intention to form a partnership with each other; that is,
there must be more than a sham transaction or the grantee will not
be constituted a partner for tax purposes. 08 Several formal steps
will be some evidence of the necessary good faith intention, and
these should carefully be followed; for example, there should be
a formal partnership agreement, 0 and public attention should be
called to the fact of partnership by giving notice to those who had
dealt with the old management."10 However, the single most im-
104. For example, the family partnership involved in Parker v. Westover, 144
F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1956), included partners whose ages were 14, 11, 6 and 3.
Certainly they could give no vital service to the partnership.
105. LR.C. §704(e); Charles B. Blonder, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 242 (1948);
Murphy, The Role of the Family Partnership in Tax Planning, N.Y.U. 15=-m Isr. ox
FED. TAx 149, 161 (1957).
106. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
107. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 837 U.S. 733 (1949), was interpreted by
many lower courts as holding that family partnerships could be valid for tax pur-
poses only if they were created for a business purpose other than tax reduction.
See, e.g., Slifka v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1950). However, two years
subsequent to the Culbertson decision, Congress enacted a provision, now § 704(e)
of the 1954 Code, which requires tax recognition of partners who own a capital
interest in a partnership regardless of the reason for the creation of the partner-
ship. The Senate committee report states that the committee believed this to be the
proper interpretation of the Culbertson decision. S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 40 (1951). Although the Code provision is applicable only to taxable years
beginning subsequent to 1950 and has not yet been applied by the courts, many
cases decided subsequent to the enactment of the family partnership provision
have recognized a partner for tax purposes without requiring a business purpose.
See, e.g., Henslee v. Whitson, 200 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1952); Drechsler v. United
States, 161 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); contra, Maxwell v. Commissioner, 208
F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1953).
108. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
109. Sidney Cohen, 27 T.C. 221 (1956); Mary Frances Lewis, 23 T.C. 538
(1954). The absence of a formal agreement was regarded as some evidence that
the parties did not intend to form a partnership in Stoffield v. Commissioner, 203
F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1953).
110. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Maxwell v. Commis-
sioner, 208 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1953); Treas. Reg. 1.704-1(e)(2)(i) (1956).
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portant factor in determining whether the grantee is in fact a part-
ner is actual transfer of control over the partnership interest. '
Thus the two factors in family partnership cases are the control
given up by the grantor and the importance of capital in the pro-
duction of the partnership income.
(1) Control given up by the grantor
To constitute the grantee a partner, the grantor must transfer
the rights and duties incident to the partnership interest which
by the agreement he expressly purports to convey." 2 To transfer
a general partner's interest, the grantee must be given the right to
take an active part in the management of the business."" But the
grantor will generally prefer to convey a limited partnership inter-
est, in order to retain full management control." 4
If the grantee is a minor unable to exercise dominion and con-
trol over a limited partner's interest it could be held in trust for
his benefit." 5 A third-party trustee will be recognized as a valid
partner unless he is under the control of the grantor."10 However,
such a trustee with necessarily broad powers may be able to as-
sign his partnership interest or refuse to reinvest the earnings in
the partnership; and the inclusion of the trustee within the part-
nership would to this extent be undesirable. Recently, some courts
have allowed partnerships to restrict the trustee's power over dis-
position of the capital interest transferred,"1 but any restriction on
the right to receive a full share of earnings will be strong evidence
that the parties did not intend in good faith to form in a partner-
ship."" For this reason the grantor may desire to constitute him-
111. 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.10, at 41 (1957).
112. See Theodore D. Stem, 15 T.C. 521 (1950).
113. See Lieber v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 810, 119 F. Supp. 951 (1954); Joe
Lynch, 20 T.C. 1052 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 216 F.2d 574 (1954).
114. For examples of cases upholding family limited partnerships without par-
ticipation in management by the limited partners, see Greenberger v. Commis-
sioner, 177 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1949); Thomas H. Brodhead, 18 T.C. 726 (1952);
Theodore D. Stem, 15 T.C. 521 (1950); see Treas. Reg. 1.704-1(c)(2)(Ix)
(1956); but see Roughan v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 253 (4th Cir. 1952).
115. See Mary Frances Lewis, 23 T.C. 538, 548 (1954).
116. Louis R. Eisenmann, 17 T.C. 1426 (1952); Treas. Reg. 1.704-1(c)(2)
(vii) (1956). Conversely, in Fred M. Harvey, 21 T.C. 1020 (1954), the family
partnership was held invalid because the trustee-partner was an employee of the
partnership and not acting in an independent manner.
117. E.g., Leon Fainbatt, 27 T.C. 989 (1957) (grantor restricted sale of limited
partner's interest without consent of all members); Thomas H. Brodhead, 18 T.C.
726, 729, 734 (1952) (trustee of capital was required to purchase limited part-
ner's interest and could not assign without the consent of the general partner).
S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1951) states: "Not every restriction upon
the complete and unfettered control by the donee of the property will be indicative
of sham in the transaction." (Emphasis added.)
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(viii) (1956); See Boyt v. Commissioner,
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self trustee. If the grantor does this he can, as a practical matter,
transfer a general partner's interest without losing management
control. However, it would be very difficult to prove that he is
acting independently as trustee, segregating the management rights
of the trust from his personal management interest"" On the other
hand, he can more easily show independent action as trustee of a
limited partner's interest by segregating the trust funds from his
personal funds.120 The most serious danger of not having an inde-
pendent trustee, however, is that the grantor-trustee may not fully
understand the importance of rigorous allegiance to the formalities
of separating the funds, or he may be tempted to invade the corpus
occasionally for his own use.
(2) Capital as an income producing factor
If the partnership earnings are solely the result of the grantors
efforts, any transfer of a "partnership interest" is logically a mere
assignment of his income, 12 ' and accordingly the Code2'2 and Treas-
ury Regulations' recognize the grantee as a partner only if capital
is a material income-producing factor in the business. Recently
courts have been more liberal; in Greenberger v. Commissioner,'2
though the partnership income was earned by commissions on
sales and capital was not a material factor of income production,
the court upheld the family partnership on the finding of a good
faith intention to share profits. The Greenberger case was recently
followed in Leeb v. Jarecke,125 which held a family partnership
valid even though the annual earnings of the partnership were as
high as 670% of the capital investment. The court expressly denied
that a family partnership could be created only when capital was
essential to the business, and held it sufficient that some capital
was "necessary to the formation and continuance of the busi-
ness."2 6 Although, both Congress's "material income producing
factor" and the courts' "of some importance" tests are subjective,
209 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1954); Joe Lynch, 20 T.C. 1052, 1066 (1953), rcv'd on
other grounds, 216 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1954); William D. West, 19 T.C. 808
(1953); Russell Giffen, 14 T.C. 1272 (1950).
119. See, e.g., Smith v. Westover, 123 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Calif. 1954); bid
see Dickstein v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
120. See, e.g., Theodore D. Stern, 15 T.C. 521 (1950).
121. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
122. LR.C. § 704(e).
123. Treas. Reg. 1-704(e)(1)(iv) (1956).
124. 177 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1949).
125. 156 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. IlL 1957). As this decision determined the validity
of a family limited partnership during years prior to the effective date of section
704(e), the section was not applicable. However, the court indicated a similar
decision would have been reached had section 704(e) been applicable. Id. at 10.
126. 156 F. Supp. 6, 9 (N.D. Ml1 1957).
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the difference in degree is apparent. Certainly capital is not a ma-
terial income-producing factor when the business returns capital
at the rate of once every two months, but it may be of some im-
portance in maintaining the business. Therefore, unless future cases
adopt the congressional view, family income can be split by gift
of capital interest in most businesses which do not derive their
income solely from personal services.' 27 Because of the Commis-
sioner's difficulty in establishing the invalidity of family partner-
ships upon the ground that capital was not a material income pro-
ducing factor, he may rather in the future attempt to adjust the
earnings of the partners for tax purposes to more adequately reflect
the value of each partner's services. 128
(B) Income splitting through electing family corporations
Insofar as a family partnership avoids the double taxation of dis-
tributions to family members who are not employees of the busi-
ness, it is superior to the nonelecting family corporation as an in-
come splitting device. However, since the family corporation which
elects under Subchapter S avoids the double taxation of dividends,
it may offer equal, if not better, opportunities for family income
splitting.
The elements of a valid transfer of stock for tax purposes are
similar to those of a valid transfer of a limited partnership interest:
to shift the incidence of taxation upon future earnings of stock,
earnings must be attributable to capital ownership 29 and the donor
must irrevocably invest the donee with all the rights of a share-
holder of the class of stock conveyed. 130
However, a unique problem is presented by the use of the elect-
ing corporation as a family income splitting device. Trustees can-
not be shareholders of an electing corporation, since the coTora-
tion will not qualify as a "small business corporation" if it has 'as a
shareholder a person, (other than an estate) who is not an indi-
vidual." ' However, without the use of a trustee, it would be very
difficult to prove that a minor grantee exercises dominion and con-
trol over the property and earnings by assuming a shareholder's
rights and duties, since in an electing corporation these must in-
127. See I.R.C. § 704(e)(2).
128. See I.R.C. § 704(e); Lifton, The Family Partnership: Here We Go Again,
7 TAx L. REv. 461, 468-71 (1952).
129. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Babson v. Delany, 51 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 1346 (D. Mass. 1956).
130. For example, nonvoting stock may be transferred to family members,
thereby effecting the transfer of income without loss of control. See P. O'B. Mont-
gomery, 1 T.C. 1000 (1943), aff'd, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944).
131. I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2).
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elude the right to vote and receive dividends for his personal use. 3 2
Thus, the grantor must transfer stock directly to the minor" and
appoint a guardian 34 or a custodian' 35 to exercise dominion and
control for him.
If the grantor has an independent guardian appointed, transfer
of the stock transfer will be recognized for tax purposes, 3 0 but the
grantor will have lost the voting rights of the transferred stock.
If the grantor himself becomes the child's guardian or custodian
he can, of course, retain voting control of the stock until the minor
reaches majority; however, since the voting rights of the share-
holder in an electing corporation are analogous to the management
rights of a partner, it would be difficult to show that the grantor-
guardian exercised his personal voting rights independently of his
voting rights as guardian. 3 7 For this reason an independent guard-
ian may be necessary. Therefore, if the grantor wants to retain
voting control over the interest he conveys, he may have to use
the limited partnership form.
If, however, the grantor is willing to lose voting control of the
transferred stock, but wants to insure that the profits of the busi-
ness will be reinvested, he may prefer the electing corporation to
the limited partnership; although the earnings of an electing corpo-
ration are taxed as if they had been totally distributed, 3 8 the grantor
need not divest himself of dominion and control over total earn-
ings, but only over those earnings declared by the corporation to
be distributable as dividends. 39 The grantor who retains manage-
ment control (by retaining at least fifty-one percent of the stock)
over the distributions of earnings, retains the discretionary power
132. See Gouldman v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1948) (stock voted
by grantor); Sewell v. United States, 109 Ct. CL 623, 73 F. Supp. 957 (1947)
(grantee was never informed of meetings and never voted); but see Lawton v. Com-
missioner, 164 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947).
133. Minors are competent to receive stock. Ralph R. Anderson, 5 T.C. 443
(1945) (dictum); Edward H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940).
134. For a typical statute governing guardians see M!nw. STAT. §§ 5.5.45-
.612 (1953).
135. Under the UNrFom! Gnr-rs To Mwoas AcT (adopted in 30 states, 9b
U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1958)), the donor may appoint himself or a third person as
"custodian" for the gift. Custodians have broad powers to sell, exchange, invest
and reinvest the custodial property, as well as to exercise the voting rights of the
minor. UNUForB GIF-rs To Mn.ORs Aer § 4. The portion of income earned by the
stock which is not used to discharge a legal obigation of support owed to the
minor, is includible in the minor's gross income. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 Cmr.
BuIL. 23. See generally Schlesinger, When and How To Use the New Statutonj
Custodian for Gifts to Minors, 5 J. T.xAnioN 263 (1956).
136. See, e.g., Lawrence Miller v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 285 (1943), acq., 1943
Ctm. BuLL. 17.
137. See note 119 supra.
138. See I.R.C. § 1872.
139. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Thomas, 146 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1944).
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to reinvest earnings. On the other hand, if the grantor of a limited
partnership interest retains discretion to reinvest earnings, he has
created strong evidence that he did not intend to form a partner-
ship. 14
0
The Commissioner may adjust the income of family members to
adequately reflect the value of services rendered by the grantor
either to a limited partnership' or to an electing corporation. 42
However, he may reallocate income of an electing corporation only
among those family members who are shareholders in the corpora-
tion. 43 Thus, by transferring all of his stock, the grantor in an elect-
ing corporation may be able to transfer the total earnings of the
business to family members. This, of course, is an advantage only
if the grantor is willing to lose complete control of the corporation,
and has much outside income.
III. ORGANIZATIONS UNABLE To INCORPORAT
As a result of local law and professional codes of ethics, many
firms of doctors, lawyers, stock brokers and other practicing pro-
fessionals are unable to incorporate. 44 However, Subchapter S
may nevertheless offer such firms tax savings which were previously
unavailable. As members of an organization classified as a partner-
ship for tax purposes, the professionals cannot obtain tax savings
from employee fringe benefits. 45 However, in United States v.
Kintner,14 6 a group of practicing physicians did obtain employee
fringe benefits by intentionally organizing with sufficient corporate
similarity to cause the business to be classified as a corporation
for tax purposes. Although the Kintner organization involved only
fringe benefit deductions, an election under Subchapter S, if avail-
able, would of course relieve the firm of corporate taxes. Since the
Subchapter S election is nowhere explicitly limited to organizations
which have actually incorporated, it is apparently available to
unincorporated "associations." However, it must be stressed that
this is a purely analytical result, which courts might hesitate to
accept without positive showing that Congress intended Sub-
chapter S to be available to unincorporated associations.
140. See cases cited in note 118 supra.
141 I.R.C. § 704(e)(2).
142. I.R.C. § 1375(c).
143. Ibid. On the other hand § 704(e)(2) requires the allocation of income
of the donor and donee to reflect services rendered by the donor regardless of
whether the donor is a partner in the business.
144. See, e.g., MIN4. STAT. § 481.02 (1953) (precluding attorneys from in-
corporating or corporations from selling legal services).
145. Rev. Rul 57-163, 57-1 Cum. BuuL. 128, 134.
146. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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Though a valid limited partnership may be a corporation for
tax purposes, most limited partnership statutes require that the
partnership consist of at least one general, managing partner and
one limited, non-managing partner. Since managing and non-man-
aging interests quite clearly constitute two classes of stock1 4T for
purposes of Subchapter S, a limited partnership generally cannot
elect under Subehapter S. Therefore, if associations are allowed
to elect under Subchapter S and thereby obtain corporate tax
f inge benefits, professional organizations may wish to organize in
another form, for the "Small Business Association." 48
CONCLUSION
Although Subchapter S is a more desirable business form in many
circumstances than the limited partnership, it should not be arbi-
trarily preferred by every small business. Depending upon the cir-
cumstances and desires of the associates, one form will be more
desirable than the other. This Note has presented many of the
criteria by which a counselor may be guided in making the choice
for his clients.
147. 'he term 'stock" includes shares in an association ...... LB.C. § 7701(7).
148. The organization must meet the requirements of both the definition of
"small business corporation" contained in § 1871 of Subchapter S and the definition
of "association" contained in Morrissey.
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